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Highlights of the Major Arguments
PRO: A special election within approximately 60 days after a mayoral vacancy
would provide for a smooth and rapid transition, enabling voters to elect the individual of their choice to fill the highest office in the City as soon as
possible.
PRO: The current law requires voters to wait too long before electing a new mayor. Depending on the timing of the vacancy, the public advocate could serve as interim mayor for up to 15 months without being elected to that office.
PRO: Vacancies in other City elected offices usually are filled through a nonpartisan special election held approximately 45 days from the date of the
vacancy, with a party primary and general election held later to fill the vacancy. Vacancies in the mayoralty should be filled in the same manner.
PRO: The Charter Revision Commission conducted an open and thorough review. It
held public hearings in each borough, included highly qualified civic leaders representing varied backgrounds, and operated in an independent manner.
PRO: The Commission was responsive to concerns expressed by the public and demonstrated this by not adopting several other proposals.
PRO: The public advocate’s power to preside over the Council must be eliminated for this proposal to be permissible under State law. The public
advocate’s other powers, including the power to introduce legislation, participate in debate in the Council, and serve on Council committees, are
not affected by this change.
PRO: In addition to eliminating the public advocate’s power to preside over
the Council, the proposal would also eliminate the public advocate’s power to vote in case of a tie. However, tie votes in the Council are unlikely,
so this change would not have a significant impact on the public advocate’s powers.
PRO: When this proposal was put to the voters in 1999, it was coupled with other proposals as one ballot question. Now the public can judge it on
its own merits.
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CON: This proposal may lead to too many elections, could cause instability, and could drive voter turnout down. Under the proposal,
depending on the timing of the vacancy, a special election is held about 60 days from the date of the
vacancy to elect an interim mayor (followed by a run-off election, if necessary), followed by a party primary and general
election (perhaps many months later). Then, the new mayor replaces the interim mayor and serves out
the remaining term of the mayor who left office, resulting in up to four different mayors in as many years.
CON: In the event of a vacancy, particularly in a time of crisis, the public
advocate should not be distracted by an election 60 days away. The public advocate succeeding the mayor should be focused entirely on governing
the City and handling any crisis.
CON: Sixty days is not enough time for candidates in the special election to
establish their campaigns or for voters to learn about those candidates for an office as important as that of the mayor, particularly if the public
advocate succeeds the mayor in a time of crisis. The time period before the special
election should be longer.
CON: Voters elect a public advocate knowing that he or she is next in line for
mayor. There is no need to limit further the time the public advocate serves as acting mayor in the event of a vacancy.
CON: The Charter Revision Commission’s hearings primarily considered the issues of nonpartisan elections and whether the public advocate or
someone else should succeed the mayor. The public largely did not focus or comment on the
issue of the timing of the special election, or on the effects of eliminating the power of the public advocate to preside over the
Council and the power to vote in case of a tie.
CON: The public advocate plays an important role as the City’s watchdog and as
a counterweight to the mayor. This proposal would undermine those roles.
CON: The Charter Revision Commission, chosen by the mayor, was created in mid-July. No Commission has ever had less time to consider
and propose revisions to the Charter. Hearings were held in August, a month when public
schools are closed and many people are away on vacation. The Commission did not have adequate time to study this issue,
nor did the public.
CON: This proposal was already put to the voters in 1999 and rejected.
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Statements from the Public - Pro
Michael R. Bloomberg, Mayor, City of New York
Earlier this year, I appointed a Commission of thirteen highly distinguished citizens who accurately reflected New York City’s electorate: ethnically and politically diverse, and fiercely independent. They discussed and debated a number of issues, but on one they were in complete agreement: if there is a
vacancy in the Office of the Mayor, a special election should be held in 60 days to fill the vacancy. Currently, if a mayor dies while in office or leaves prematurely, voters may have to wait up to 15 months until an elected mayor takes office, during which time the public advocate would serve as interim mayor.
After receiving strong public input from across the five boroughs, the Commission unanimously recommended that a special election be held to fill a vacancy. The change would enhance democracy and, in doing so, improve the performance of government. For both these reasons, I strongly support this
change to the City’s Charter.
A mayoral vacancy will likely raise fundamental questions about the future of the City. These questions, if left unanswered by the voters, could impede the city’s progress and growth for up to fifteen months. Indeed, if an interim
mayor lacks public support and confidence, government operations could suffer, legislation could stall, and long-term planning could be impossible. These are costs we cannot afford to bear. The proposed special election, by enhancing democratic expression, would provide a quick transition, ensuring a responsive and capable government.
Every other elected city office holds special elections to fill vacancies, yet none is more central to the City’s governance than the mayor. The voters deserve the right to choose their mayor in a timely manner. The City’s well-being requires it. I hope you will join me in supporting this proposal.
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Robert J. McGuire, Chair, Charter Revision Commission
Under the present Charter if a Mayor dies while in office or leaves before his or her term is completed, it may take up to 15 months before an election is held to fill the mayoral vacancy. For every other city office, from the City Council to the Public Advocate, vacancies are filled by special elections.
To ensure a smooth transition in the event that the office of mayor is vacated, the 2002 Charter Revision Commission unanimously recommends that a special election be held within 60 days of a mayoral vacancy. The Public Advocate will
serve as interim mayor until a newly elected mayor takes office. However, in order to comply with state law to permit the Public Advocate to serve as interim mayor, it is necessary to transfer the Public Advocate’s role as presiding officer of the City Council to the Speaker of the City Council. The other powers of the office of Public Advocate are not affected by this change.
Thus the Commission recommends that the voters approve this Charter Revision.
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Mitchell L. Moss, Henry Hart Rice Professor of Urban Policy and Planning, Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, New York
University
All eight million New Yorkers depend on the Mayor to make sure that our municipal government provides vital public services such as public safety, education, garbage collection, parks, and, of course, timely snow removal. The mayor is the central force in our municipal government. Should a vacancy occur, voters must be able to choose a replacement as quickly as possible.
New Yorkers understand that the mayor is the only citywide elected official who is held responsible for the day-to-day performance of municipal agencies. The mayor also sets the tone for our city, the symbol of our city to the nation and the world. When New Yorkers elect a mayor, they look for individuals with outstanding character, leadership, and judgment. The mayor is the leader of the entire city, the focal point for mobilizing civic, business, labor and religious organizations to serve the needs of the city.
An interim mayor should be a short-term caretaker, providing stability to the government while sufficient time is allowed for an election to take place, not a lame duck placeholder who can serve for up to fifteen months, as the law currently provides. That’s why the proposed change to the City’s charter of holding a special election in sixty days is so important.
Ironically, for every elected city office except the office of mayor, special elections are held to fill vacancies. Yet, to be effective, a mayor must be a strong leader with a mandate from the voters. Now is the time to correct the City Charter so that New Yorkers will be able to elect a mayor should a vacancy
arise at a future time.
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Statements from the Public - Con
Betsy Gotbaum, Public Advocate, City of New York
Vote NO on the referendum. While the idea of a swift special election may seem appealing, the proposal is ill-considered and conceals an attack on the democratic process in New York City.
Rushed Process, Flawed Results. The Mayor’s hastily-organized charter revision commission had only 44 days to come up with changes to the city’s constitution. The 1988-89 charter commission deliberated for two years and held 31 public
hearings. It’s no wonder this commission’s proposal will have long-term harmful effects.
A Chaotic Succession Proposal. Under this succession proposal, the city could have as many as four mayors and six elections in just over one year. That’s no way to help the city through the crisis of a mayoral vacancy. The current system of succession is better. The commission’s special election proposal may also violate the Federal Voting Rights Act by reducing the voting power of minorities.
A Stealth Attack. The referendum takes from the Public Advocate the right to preside over the City Council, a role essential to the city’s watchdog. The office of Public Advocate was created as a counterweight to our increasingly strong Mayor. For this reason, the Mayor has often tried to weaken the office. As recently as 1999, the Mayor presented to the voters the same proposal to take from the Public Advocate the role of presiding over the Council. Voters rejected the idea by a 3-to-1 margin. So why are we going through this again?
There are better means of shortening the time of mayoral succession legislatively without diminishing the power of the Public Advocate. Let’s use those methods instead of this stealth attack on my office.
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Mark Green, President, New Democracy Project
Having served as your Public Advocate for eight years, I’m urging you to vote NO on a ballot proposal which would seriously undermine that office.
Bad Process. The Charter Commission concluded that creating special mayor elections requires stripping the Public Advocate of its ability to preside at City Council meetings and introduce legislation. But this impact
was never even debated or discussed during hurried summer hearings.
Bad Policy. The Public Advocate is supposed to be "a counterweight to the Mayor," independently investigating city agencies and proposing better solutions. That assignment requires an institutional involvement with the City Council. For example, our Advocate office helped enact several important laws, including the city’s campaign finance statute and a ban on workplace discrimination against domestic violence victims. A Mayor shouldn’t undermine the Advocate’s mandate to be a watchdog over the Mayor.
Better Alternative. The guaranteed succession of an elected, experienced city-wide official until the next general election - as Albany, Rochester and Buffalo require - is preferable to having a quickie election potentially during a crisis. Imagine if we had a special election for president on December 22, 1963? But if the Commission prefers this option, let’s
change state law rather than cripple the Public Advocate.
In 1999, Mayor Giuliani’s Charter Commission made a similar proposal that voters defeated 76%-24%. Given urgent challenges to rebuild our city and our school system, why are we refighting a previously voted-down idea and altering a 170-year precedent? If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.
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Robin Bahr, Chair, The League of Women Voters of the City of New York
The League of Women Voters supports an open, participatory, deliberative process when considering revisions to our City Charter. The proposal submitted for voter approval on the November ballot does not meet this standard.
The Charter Revision Commission was appointed on July 13th and voted on this proposal on September 3rd. We do not believe that these few weeks in the middle of the summer offered adequate opportunity for public comment and for a full
discussion of the issues involved in this proposal.
While we may agree that the time frame, as currently specified in the Charter, to hold a special election for mayor when there is a vacancy in that office merits reconsideration, there is no urgency to pass this proposal in such a hasty manner. Substituting the Speaker for the Public Advocate as the presiding officer of the City Council was not discussed until the last days of Commission’s deliberations.
We applaud the Commission’s decision to defer revision of mayoral succession and nonpartisan elections. Given the interdependence of one charter provision upon another and the limited time in which the Commission had to act we had
hoped that they would defer all proposals and recommend consideration by a new or re-appointed Charter Revision Commission with more time to deliberate the many ramifications of these important issues.
Therefore, we urge you to VOTE NO.
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Statements in favor of the Charter Revision proposal were also submitted by Wellington Z. Chen, Jerry E. Garcia, Cecilia E. Norat, and Dr. Marlene Springer, members of the Charter Revision Commission.
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